Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations by Twohig, R. Raymond, Jr.
UNCERTAINTY IN COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY
REGULATIONS
This year more than 1.5 million young adults' began their
studies at nearly 2,500 colleges2 in the United States. Prior to the
beginning of classes the new student received a handbook or cata-
logue for his reference, guidance and orientation containing a
regulation such as the following:
Individuals and organizations must consider themselves obli-
gated at all times and all places to conduct themselves, individ-
ually and as groups, as to reflect only credit on the University.3
It may strike the young student as unusual that all his actions,
whether on the campus or in his own home, must now be marshalled
toward the university's benefit rather than his own. If such demand
seems too oppressive to the prospective student, he can simply enroll
elsewhere, although it is doubtful he will escape such a provision so
easily. The catalogue is also likely to contain this kind of rule:
It is taken for granted that each student * * * will adhere to
acceptable standards of personal conduct; and that all students
* * * will set and observe among themselves proper standards of
conduct and good taste * * * This presumption in favor of the
students * * * continues until, by misconduct, it is reversed, in
which case the University authorities will take such action as
the particular occurrence judged in the light of the attendant
circumstances, may seem to require....4
Casual scrutiny will indicate that "good taste," "proper conduct"
and "acceptable conduct" are required of the student if he is to
remain in good standing at the university. The thoughtful young
man may wonder to whom his conduct must be "acceptable," what is
"proper" and what "good taste" requires. Is it in good taste to
demonstrate against the Viet Nam war? Or is he required to support
it?5 Is criticism of the general conduct rule "proper?" May the editor
of the student newspaper criticize the governor of the state?0
I L. LONG, 1968 WORLD ALMANAC, 153. Total enrollment in institutions of higher
education in 1966 was 6.5 million.
2 Id.
3 THE Onto STATE UN asr , STuDENT HANDBoo RuLEs AND INroRMA-noN 8
(1968) (emphasis added).
4 General Catalog of the University of California at Berkley, as set forth in
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 870, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 466 n.2 (1967).
5 See Appellants' Opening Brief, Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248
Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967), at 11.
6 See Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (.M.D. Ala. 1967).
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To a lawyer, general conduct regulations such as those men-
tioned above appear to have fatal deficiencies. Problems of vagueness
and overbreadth come immediately to mind.7 The lawyer will rec-
ognize that the state university is an administrative arm of govern-
ment for some purposes.8 He may recall the recent emphasis on
higher education 9 and the great investments of federal and state
funds in both public and private institutions.10 These facts coupled
with state licensing and degree-granting practices may convince him
that the due process limitations on vagueness and overbreadth must
be applicable to nearly all of the 2,500 colleges and universities in
the United States, whether publicly or privately owned.
A study of American case law will indicate a history quite
different from these expectations. The courts have seldom over-
turned disciplinary actions, whether taken by public or private
universities.1" Little regard has been paid to the reasons for which
the actions were taken, since an "academic judgments rule"'12 has
reposed broad discretion in administrators. The 1934 United States
7 See generally Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 Micn. L. Rixv.
831 (1923); Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CoaRNE a L.Q.
195 (1955); Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29 RoCKY
MT. L. RFv. 275, 287 (1957); Quarles, Some Statutory Construction Problems and
Approaches in Criminal Law, 3 VAND. L. REv. 531 (1950); Comment, Legislation-
Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 MICis. L. R1v. 264 (1954): Note,
Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 H~a. L. Rnv. 77 (1948); Note,
The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960);
28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 333 (1962); 61 HAnv. L. REv. 1208 (1948).
8 Administrative regulations are subject to the requirement of specificity as If
they were statutes. Pike v. CAB, 303 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1962).
9 See President Johnson's statements, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1965, at 20, col. 1.
10 Federal aid to education in 1966 totalled 10.6 billion dollars. L. LON(, 1968
WORLD ALMANAc 157.
11 E.g., Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Dehaan V.
Brandeis Univ. 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Col.
lege, 40 Ill. 186 (1866); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Carr
v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, rev'd 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d
410, aff'd 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18 (1962); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App.
Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928); People ex rel. Goldenkoff v. Albany Law School, 198
App. Div. 460, 191 N.Y.S. 349 (1921); Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 11 Ohio C,
Dec. 515 (Ct. App. 1901).
12 The tendency of the decisions listed supra note 11, and many others, has been
to treat the academic administrator's judgment in the same fashion as the business
judgments of a corporate director. The deference has extended, however, from the
academic realm to the conduct area, in which the expertise of the court is unsurpassed.
Such rules of deference should be extended only to areas where the courts lack ex-
pertise and are unable to easily become knowledgeable.
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Supreme Court decision in Hamilton v. Regents of the University
of California's approved nearly unlimited discretion for administra-
tors in student disciplinary matters. This situation moved Professor
Seavey to observe that a college student is denied even "the rights
accorded a pickpocket."'14
The lawyer who is consulted by a college student about a disci-
plinary matter today will find himself involved in a rapidly develop-
ing area of the law. Pressures' 5 and decisions 0 are forcing reevalua-
tion of student rights. In 1961 the right to a hearing was accorded
college students in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education.17
This landmark case was the genesis of many recent examinations by
commentators which have attempted to determine theories and
rules of law to be applied in the growing number of cases presenting
student claims.' 8
Application of constitutional principles to institutions of higher
learning is a delicate task. The university is not generally heavily
staffed with lawyers to draft its regulations, man its courts and advise
its administrators. The dean of students is trained in education and
counselling, not in jurisprudence. College students are historically
carefree and hyperactive, and sanctions are essential tools to assure
the maintenance of order and decorum. However, since the univer-
sity is properly termed an agency of the state,19 the Constitution
protects the student from its arbitrary action,2 0 and requires its rules
to meet certain standards.2 1
'3 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
14 Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HAv. L. REv. 1406, 1407 (1957).
15 See Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54 CAzr. L. Rxv. 1 (1966),
for a discussion of the early activities at Berkelcy, including the filthy speech move-
ment that was the subject of the disdplinary action challenged in Goldberg v. Regents
of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
16 See, eg., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961); Hammond v. So. Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947
(D.S.C. 1967); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961);
Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967); Cornette v. Aldridge, 408 S.W.2d 935 (rex. Civ. App. 1966).
17 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
Is See the extensive bibliography in 54 CAur. L. Rxv. 177 (1966); Developments
in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAmv. L. Rxv. 1045 (1968).
19 Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of New York City, 350 US. 551 (1956); Mc-
Laurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 US. 637 (1950).
20 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867,
57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
21 See generally Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
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The due process clause protects persons from the enforcement
of vague22 and overly broad23 statutes and regulations. The uncer-
tainty of application inherent in such rules presents ex post facto
dangers24 familiar to early legal scholars:
In Dwar. St. 652 it is laid down "that it is impossible to dissent
from the doctrine of Lord Coke, that acts of parliament ought
to be plainly and clearly, and not cunningly and darkly, penned,
especially in legal matters." 25
The common law development of this principle was based on con-
cepts of fair play and the courts' abilities to apply statutes without
usurpation of the legislative function.20 Since the courts' tasks were
limited to construction and application of legislative enactments,
where use of devices of construction failed to eliminate vagueness
application was refused.27
Due process analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the ade-
quacy of notice. 28 It must be sufficient to forewarn that sanctions will
be imposed upon contemplated conduct.29 Thus a regulation must
set ascertainable standards of conduct.80 While the requirement of
scienter may often be implied in the criminal law, it may not ,be
presumed where no ascertainable standard exists from which guilty
knowledge might derive.31 Notice is defective where a statute
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw iN TRANs. Q.
1 (1965). See also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).
22 See sources cited note 7 supra. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
23 Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
24 See text accompanying note 52 infra.
25 Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 F. 866, 876 (1888).
26 Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 34 Misc.
2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403, rev'd 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, afj'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18 (1962); Patten v. Aluminum Castings Co., 105 Ohio St. 1, 136 N.E. 426
(1922).
27 See Comment, Legislation-Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards,
53 MICH. L. Rxv. 264, 265 n.2 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Comment). See also cases
cited note 26 supra.
28 As will be seen, while the fact of notice is the hornbook focal point, the issues
of standing and justiciability do not, in fact, depend on actual notice. See the standard
suggested in Comment supra note 27, at 268 n.17.
29 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 US. 268 (1951); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,
524 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
30 Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Orange County, 368 US. 278 (1961).
31 McBoyle V. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.....32
Where tools are available for an educated guess, statutes have been
upheld against a vagueness attack. Thus, where an allegedly vague
term has a comm6n law meaning, it is not indefinite for constitu-
tional purposes.33 The interpretation by a judicial or administrative
body can cure the vagueness, if the construction is reasonable. 4 And
where a statute has long been consistently applied, its ambiguities
may have been dissipated.3 5
An allegation of failure of notice requires standing. Thus, if a
statute is not vague as applied, the party before the court usually
may not assert its indefiniteness when applied to a hypothetical
party.30 Notwithstanding this principle, if the vagueness is of a
nature to permit of a chilling effect upon the exercise of first amend-
ment rights, the statute must fall.sT
[S]tricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be
applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on
speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here,
because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.3
The due process requirements of notice apply to civil as well as
criminal regulations.39 Thus, vagueness limitations exist upon any
civil enactment, since
It is not the penalty... that is invalid but the exaction of obedi-
ence to a rule or standard that is so vague and indefinite as to
be really no rule or standard at all.40
While the test of vagueness is the existence of an ascertainable
-32 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
33 Nash v. United States, 229 US. 373 (1913).
34 Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915); Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447
(1905).
35 FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro. Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 312-313 (1934).
s6 Fox v. Washington, 236 US. 273, 277 (1915). But see Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 518-20 (1948); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. I REv. 67, 96-104 (1960) (hereinafter cited as Void-for-Vagueness).
37 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Cramp v. Bd. of Public Instruction of
Orange County, 368 US. 278 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Herndon
v. Lowry, 301 US. 242 (1937).
38 Smith v. California, 361 US. 147, 151 (1959).
39 Pike v. CAB, 303 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1962).
40 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 US. 210, 243 (1932).
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standard,41 the degree of certainty with which such standard may be
ascertained must necessarily vary. The delicate due process balanc-
ing necessary to determine a vagueness question42 has produced a
few general rules.48 As mentioned, a high degree of specificity is
necessary in the first amendment area.44 The means of execution 45
and severity of sanctions46 are also determinants of the extent of per-
missible vagueness. Where a regulation requires a showing of cul-
pability it is thought to require less definiteness, 47 apparently due to
natural law emphasis on punishment for acts denominated mala in
se. If greater specificity may be easily achieved, the statute is more
likely to be declared void.48
An understanding of the dangers of vagueness will permit a
court to study the context in which an allegedly vague regulation is
applied, and determine the question on the basis of the existence
of those dangers. While the vagueness doctrine is a branch of the
due process notice requirement, 49 principles of uncertainty of ap-
plication50 and fear of governmental abuse51 are at its heart. It is
conceptually linked to the prohibition of ex post facto laws, though
not doctrinally related.52 The tyranny and arbitrariness inherent in
after-the-fact lawmaking can be as easily perpetuated by administra-
tive action where general or ambiguous statutes exist. Vagueness of
written regulations may allow nearly any construction which an ad-
ministrator finds convenient, and permit punishment for any con-
duct with which he takes issue. It appears a more dangerous standard
exists in the case of vague regulations than in the case of government
41 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 264 (1937).
42 See Void-for-Vagueness, supra note 36, at 94-96 for a thorough analysis of the
Court's balancing processes in the vagueness area.
43 Id. at 88 n.103; Comment, supra note 27, at 270-75.
44 Cases cited note 37 supra.
45 See Comment, supra note 27, at 270-72.
46 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948).
47 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S.
513 (1942).
48 See Void-for-Vagueness, supra note 36, at 95 n.150; United States v. Cardiff, 344
U.S. 174 (1952).
49 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
50 See Winters v. New York, 385 U.S. 507 (1948); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1937).
51 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957).
52 The more recent cases speak of vagueness as a due process defect, though there
was early reference to the sixth amendment's notice requirement in United States V.
Cohen Groc. Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
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without written regulations. This is due to the false sense of security
created by written regulations which, in effect, allows easy entrap-
ment of an administrator's chosen victims with apparent legitimacy.
.The rule of law then becomes a subtler vehicle for repression.
A branch from the same tree is the doctrine of overbreadth.53
It requires that legislation be drawn narrowly enough to achieve a
permissible purpose without infringing upon protected liberties.54
While the state may legitimately protect itself from subversion, for
example, it may not do so by punishing any person who contributes
to an organization associated with the Communist Party.3 The
statute which is drawn broadly, even if never utilized to limit
personal freedoms, often has an inhibiting effect upon exercise of
those freedoms through its mere existence.50 This is the "chilling
effect" spoken of in the overbreadth cases.57 Though the party be-
fore the court has engaged in conduct which the state might legiti-
mately regulate, he has standing to challenge the regulation for its
overbreadth.58 The inhibiting effect of some statutory restraints on
speech, association and travel are thought to be sufficiently danger-
ous that courts will not punish violators and will allow challenges
against these statutes for overbreadth or vagueness.59 Thus, there
exists a constitutional right not to be punished pursuant to a vague
or overly broad statute.
In determining vagueness questions, the applicable standard is
not one of wholly consistent academic definition of abstract terms.
The practical criterion of fair notice must be met, and fairness is
to be judged in the light of the statute's direction. The particular
context is all-important. Thus, a license revocation is not void where
53 See Collings, supra note 7, at 218-219; Void-for-Fagueness, supra note 36, at
75-85; See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), where the line
between overbreadth and vagueness becomes extremely fuzzy.
54 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479
(1960); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US. 88 (1940).
55 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US. 479 (1960).
.5 Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
57 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US. 479, 487 (1965). The injunction against enforce-
ment of such statutes provided in Dombrowski is thoughtfully analyzed in Stickgold,
Variations on the Theme of Dombrowski v. Pfister ... , 1968 Wis. L. REv. 369.
58 Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
59 Academic freedom might reasonably be added to this list of first amendment
freedoms. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). See also Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents of the Univ. of the State of New York, 385 US. 589 (1967).
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done pursuant to a statute permitting discipline for "manifest in-
capacity," since such term has an ascertainable meaning to the medi-
cal profession, whose members are subject to its provision. 00 "Moral
turpitude" was held to be a sufficiently specific standard as applied
in a deportation proceeding to an alien convicted twice of conspiracy
to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits.01 However,
the term might be declared vague in another context under the doc-
trines elicited in United States v. Petrillo.02
Attorneys and doctors are regularly disciplined for "unprofes-
sional" and "disreputable" conduct. Such terms have been declared
vague in Czarra v. Bd. of Medical Supervisors,0 3 and sufficiently
definite in Phillips v. Ballinger.6 4 The term "unprofessional" may
be provided with content by the canons of ethics in the medical and
legal professions; but no such referents are available to the average
citizen. Though the term "subversive" may have specific content
when applied to employees of a defense plant, it was held vague as
applied to teachers. 05
Terms commonly used in college regulations include "accept-
able," "proper," and "good taste." While such terms have highly
subjective meanings, that is not necessarily determinative. If ac-
ceptability is construed to mean that conduct must conform with
that commonly thought appropriate by a specific group, the term
may have meaning. However, no referent is provided in most regu-
lations. Is it the conduct of the community, the administration, the
faculty, or one's fellow students one must use as a standard of ac-
ceptability? Even if that question is determined, the chilling effect
of such a regulation can be awesome. Its overbreadth presents a
danger, since, though one's ideas are unacceptable to an entire com-
munity, the first amendment assures protection of the conduct of
speaking in defense of those ideas.
"Good taste" provides yet another nebulous standard. In the
present era of changing values, past concepts of morality and ethics
60 Dilliard v. State Medical Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 P. 866 (1921). But see
Hewitt v. State Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 P. 39 (1906); Matthews v. Murphy,
23 Ky. L. Rep. 750, 63 S.W. 785 (1901).
61 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
62 332 U.S. 1 (1947). See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
63 25 App. D.C. 443 (1905).
64 37 App. D.C. 46 (1911).
(5 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of New York, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Regulations of




are of dubious validity. This appears to be especially true on the
campus at the present time. Reassessment by the student of his role
in society results in unfamiliar pressures on established institutions.
While the exertion of such pressure is itself "distasteful" to the
existing power structure, the right to express grievances and advo-
cate reforms is constitutionally protected. It appears that the very
institutions which are being challenged may, under existing regula-
tions, insulate themselves from criticism by silencing their critics.
While such a result may not seem entirely distasteful, the method of
its achievement is indefensible. The administrator may simply con-
clude that those who cast doubt upon the value of his role or his
ability to carry out his functions are not acting in "good taste." It
is surprising that the theory that the king can do not wrong could
remain an enforceable mandate on the American campus.06
Many college regulations appear to provide such power, being
both vague and overly broad.6i Though the vagueness of a regula-
tion might not be fatal when standing alone, the added inhibitions
upon speech and association often appear to require invalidation.
The recent surge in student litigation has brought the often ancient
and previously unchallenged systems of college regulations under
judicial scrutiny. In Goldberg v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia,6 participants in the Berkeley filthy speech movement at-
tempted to gain readmission to the university. Though the major
issues in the case concerned free speech, procedural due process and
equal protection, the general conduct regulation was also challenged
for vagueness. Upon finding the university had "inherent power"
to dismiss the students for their actions, the court refused to consider
the extensively briefed vagueness claim.69 While the one-sentence
holding on the question provides little insight into the court's rea-
66 For a striking illustration see Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 275 F.
Supp. 613 (MM). Ala. 1967) reviewing expulsion of a student for his writings in a
student newspaper which violated a rule prohibiting criticism of the governor or
legislature of Alabama.
67 See text accompanying note 4 supra and 81 infra.
68 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
69 Id. at 881, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 473. The challenged rule is reprinted in the text
accompanying note 4 supra. The reasoning and decision in Goldberg were followed
in Jones v. State Bd. of Education, 279 F. Supp. 190, 202 (M.D. Tenn. 1968). In Jones,
in addition to the inherent power theory, the court indicates that university regula-
tions for students need not meet the requirements of specificity imposed upon state
.statutes, since the goals and purposes of the university as well as the nature of the
institution are peculiarly different. See the discussion of such arguments in the text
accompanying notes 81 to 92 infra.
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soning, it is possible that the disruptive actions of the students,
being considered mala in se, were likened to the conduct in Williams
v. United States.70 In that case, though the Court conceded the stat-
ute might be vague as to a future defendant, the inherent "evil"
of this defendant's conduct (beating a prisoner to death) was such
as to prevent his escape from its sanctions. The reason for the failure
of Williams to prevail appears to be that the term alleged to be
vague was not vague as to his conduct. Thus, he had adequate notice
that his conduct was proscribed. 1 However, successful attacks on
vague regulations have generally been allowed by any party subject
to their provisions where a substantial chilling effect has been
present.7 2 It appears that if first amendment rights are endangered
by the statute, culpability is not a relevant consideration, and the
vagueness is fatal. The "inherent powers" of a state agency are, of
course, subject to the limitations in the Constitution. To couch the
result in such terms, as did the Goldberg court, is simply to avoid
the constitutional question. The police power is an inherent power
of each state, yet punishments are invalid if prescribed under such
power pursuant to a vague regulation. This must also be true in the
case of the university's inherent powers, however defined.
Another recent case involving vagueness of college regula-
tions is Buttny v. Smiley.73 The court there held the hazing regula-
tion which was utilized to dismiss students who blocked admission
to CIA recruiters was not vague or broad on its face. The rule au-
thorizes discipline for "any interference with the public or private
rights of citizens." 74 The court said,
Since the 'Hazing' rule is not constitutionally vague, it is not
necessary for us to make a specific finding regarding the other
rules involved. Certainly their language is broad; however, we
are unable to find any cases, nor were any called to our atten-
tion which have held university regulations such as these to be
invalid because they are so vague as to deny due process of law.
In fact the recent cases have not denied the validity and reason-
ableness of some very broad disciplinary regulations.75
70 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
71 See also Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
72 Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958); Superior Films Inc. v. Dep't. of Ednc., 159
Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953), af'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 587 (1954). For a con-
clusion that Goldberg is correct, see Note, 5 HousToN L. REv. 541, 547 (1968).
73 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
74 Id. Note the similarity of the challenge in Williams v. United States, 341 U.S.
97 (1951).
75 Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968).
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If this decision had come a bit later, its dicta might have been
different. The only case found which holds a university regulation
void for vagueness on due process grounds is Dickson v. Sitterson,7 6
decided five days after Buttny. The North Carolina statutes, pro-
cedures and regulations adopted by the university's board of trustees
to restrict speakers on the campus were held to be "facially un-
constitutional because of vagueness."' '
In order to withstand constitutional attack... [the regulations
must] . .. impose a purely ministerial duty upon the person
charged with approving or disapproving the invitation to a
speaker falling within the statutory classifications, or contain
standards sufficiently detailed to define the bounds of discretion.
Neither criteria (sic] has been met with respect to the procedures
and regulations in question.78
The regulations in Sitterson created a substantial chilling effect on
first amendment rights and provided for use of the subjective censor
condemned by the Court in Kunz v. New York. 79
Sitterson was an obvious case for application of the vagueness
doctrine. The first amendment dangers were inherent in the regula-
tions, while the nere "chilling effect" was passed over in Goldberg.
Many cases that will arise in the future will require the courts to
engage in close scrutiny of potential chilling effects on academic
freedom. 0 The nature and prevalence of the general conduct regu-
lation s makes it most amenable to scrutiny at this juncture, though
it is not the only type of college regulation open to challenge.
76 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). In Snyder v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Illinois, 286 F. Supp. 927, 933 (N.D. IlL 1968), similiar statutory restraints were subject
to a successful vagueness attack.
77 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
78 Id.
79 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951).
80 See note 59 supra. In Scoggin v. Lincoln University, 37 US.L.W.V. 2187 (W.D. Mo.
1968), a statement of principles to be applied in future student disciplinary cases was
issued. That statement concluded that overbreadth was not normally a defect in student
conduct regulations. This conclusion was premised upon the "provocative" nature of
"detailed codes of student conduct." "The validity of the form of standards of student
conduct, relevant to the lawful mission of higher education, ordinarily should be deter-
mined by recognized educational standards." The "academic judgments" rule ap-
parently continues to be applied by some courts to areas where no educational stan-
dards exist. As indicated in note 12 supra, judicial standards are readily available in
questions of student discipline. In addition, in Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 US. 195, 200
(1966), it was said that "vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity."
s1 Examination of about twenty student handbooks and catalogues has indicated
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The reason for retention of the general conduct rule is ap-
parently the fear of failing to enumerate every foreseeable act the
university- would consider offensive. If specificity and narrowness
are required, educators imagine that the ingenuity of college stu-
dents would require constant adoption of silly but specific rules to
prohibit new and unorthodox behavior. Educational institutions are
seldom equipped with full time legislative service commissions or
law clerks. It appears that the drafting of a comprehensive but suffi-
ciently specific and narrow university disciplinary code might present
a significant burden to the university.
However, while the catch-all regulation avoids the initial incon-
venience to the college, and allows its dean of students to rule with
an iron fist, it does substantial damage to the academic administra-
tion, the student government, individual students and the academic
community in general.
The dependence of the state institution and its administrators
upon the legislature and governor for funds and employment creates
political pressures upon the administration. s2 The politician who
responds to public demands will exert pressure upon administrators
to discipline students whose activities are offensive to the public.38
The existence of general conduct regulations often permits such
pressures to be effectively applied, with the result that students with
unpopular views are dismissed from college for expressing those
views. It is fair to suggest that the most severe sanctions may be
imposed upon students who come nearest the truth, since the heaviest
public response is often forthcoming where the challenged value
hangs by the most carefully preserved emotional thread.8 4 The
preservation of freedom to challenge such values is essential if the
university is to preserve its intellectual independence. If general
conduct regulations did not exist, the administration could often
fairly and happily plead helplessness in the face of unreasonable
political pressures.
the presence of such a regulation at nearly every college. This is true even though the
Attorney General of Ohio has advised state universities that rules which "merely
prohibit without penalty are susceptible for the criticism of vagueness." See limited
drculation opinion of the Attorney General of Ohio, Student Discipline at Stata Uni.
versities at 13 (August, 1967).
82 For a discussion of the usual chain of command and allegiance, see Bean, What
is the State University?, in RELIGION AND THE STATE UNIVERSITY 58, 62.64 (E. Walter
ed. 1958). See also R. MAclvF, AcADENsc FREEDoM IN OuR TIbE 237 (1955).
83 For a well known example of high level pressure against students who chal.
lenge local norms, see Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 153 (1961).
84 Id.
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The student governing bodies in some schools formulate and
administer most rules for regulation of student conduct.6 5 No matter
how responsible such governments may be, the administration will
undermine their effectiveness, independence and significance by re-
tention of general conduct regulations.
Where these regulations exist, the individual must conform his
conduct to an undefined standard to survive in the university. Fail-
ure to do so may mean expulsion. A student who is expelled from
college will find himself with few prospects of entry into any of the
professions or any other school. The college record is a universal
reference for employment, and any disciplinary action appearing on
the student's record can substantially affect his future. The student
who is aware of these facts is unlikely to violate regulations during
his college years. Fear of the consequences will motivate him to
avoid controversial issues and activities where general conduct regu-
lations make him subject to punishment if he displeases the dean of
students. While arbitrary disciplinary action may be the exception
rather than the rule, the chilling effect of such regulations upon
student conduct can be significant.
The inhibitions created in members of the academic community
by such rules are inherently in conflict with its manifest goals, since
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and un-
derstanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.86
The existence of the general conduct regulation creates the atmo-
sphere about which the Court was concerned. The seekers of "new
maturity and understanding" in the present college era are doing so
by hurling challenges at the traditions and conventions of society. 7
Free inquiry and activism are the losers where the challengers are
stifled.
The threat of use of such regulations is not idle. Responses to
a questionnaire sent to all accredited colleges and universities in
Ohio indicate the following facts about general conduct regulations:
(a) Each responding institution has such a regulation; (b) many of
85 See, e.g., WrrrENBERG UNrVERsIT STUENT HArD.oon 1967-68; see also Linde,
Campus Law-Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CALIF. L. Rnr. 40, 67-72 (1966).86 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
87 See, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 US. 930 (1961); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (MLD.N.C. 1968); Bunny
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Goldberg v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cali-
fornia, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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the regulations are vague or provide no standard at all; most provide
simply that "good conduct, .... good citizenship," "respect for the
college's principles," or "accord with high moral and ethical stan-
dards" are required; or "conduct unbecoming a student is punish-
able;"881 (c) in the 805 disciplinary actions reported in 1966 and 1967
by the 20 responding institutions, 150 or 18.6% were taken pursuant
to general conduct regulations by admission of those institutions.
These figures are probably conservative and force the conclusion
that such rules are significantly used.
The large state universities in Ohio uniformly failed to respond
to the questionnaire. Observation of the Student Court at The Ohio
State University and consultation with student defenders indicate
the general conduct rule89 is heavily utilized in non-traffic cases.
CONCLUSION
Application of the due process principles of vagueness and over-
breadth to college regulations is essential if other new-found rights
are to have any vitality. The right to a hearing, accorded in Dixon
v. Alabama State Board of Education10 is meaningless if the fact-
finding tribunal need only determine whether an act was done in
"good taste" or "reflects only credit on the university." First amend-
ment freedoms, recognized in Dickey v. Alabama State Board of
Education,91 are of little value if they may be denied by a finding
that a speech or editorial was not entirely "acceptable" nor locally
"proper."
General terminology has admitted conveniences to administra-
tors, but its use reflects an obsessive fear that a single student may go
unpunished for an unforeseen and unacceptable departure from the
norms of campus behavior. Such fears widen the gap of mistrust on
the American campus,. breeding greater discord and stronger rebel-
lions. Judicial enforcement of the rules of vagueness and over-
breadth on the campus would force administrative re-evaluation of
the university's role in the regulation of student conduct and pro-
vide needed breathing space for student freedoms.
The University of Oregon is one institution which has abolished
its general conduct regulation. An excellent set of rules was adopted
88 These "requirements" are gleaned from student handbooks, catalogues and
cases.
89 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
90 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
91 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
[Vol. 29
1968] NOTES 1037
in 1963 which seems adequate for disciplinary purposes without ap-
parently being subject to challenge for vagueness or overbreadth. 92
Such rules provide the certainty desired by students, required by the
Constitution, and essential to true academic freedom.
R. Raymond Twohig, Jr.
92 Linde, Campus Law-Berkeley Viewed From Eugene, 54 CAL. L REv. 40, 67-72
(1965). The rules there set forth are recommended for adoption by colleges and uni-
versities whose rules create uncertainty and may be unconstitutionally .ague.
